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ABSTRACT
Shelly Kagan argues that “unitarianism,” the claim that animals and
humans have equal moral status, has intuitively implausible distributive implications. I argue that Kagan’s reasoning can, with certain
modifications, be applied equally well to undermine his own view,
and that the responses Kagan can make to this modified reasoning
are also available to the unitarian responding to Kagan’s original argument. Accordingly, Kagan cannot consistently hold his own view
while also endorsing his main against unitarianism.
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1. Introduction
Shelly Kagan (2019) argues that “unitarianism,” the claim
that animals and humans have equal moral status, has intuitively implausible implications for how well-being should be
distributed. I argue that, if unitarianism has intuitively implausible distributive implications, Kagan’s own view also has intuitively implausible distributive implications. I claim our intuitions about the relevant cases are affected by a tendency to
discount distributive considerations when the distributions in
question are caused by natural forces rather than the actions
of moral agents. If Kagan says this tendency is justified, his
own view escapes the counterintuitive implications I raise, but
unitarianism also escapes the counterintuitive implications
Kagan raises. If Kagan says this tendency is unjustified, he
can say that his view has the relevant implications but that we
shouldn’t trust our intuitions that these implications are unacceptable. But the unitarian can say that their view has the relevant implications but that we shouldn’t trust our intuitions that
these implications are unacceptable. Since the moves available
to Kagan are equally available to the unitarian, Kagan cannot
consistently endorse both his own view and his main argument
against unitarianism.
In section two, I describe Kagan’s position. In section three, I
describe a counterintuitive hypothetical implication of Kagan’s
position. In section four, I describe a counterintuitive real-world
implication of Kagan’s position. In both sections I offer a diagnosis of what’s driving our intuitions and explain why this is a
problem for Kagan. In section five, I consider whether endorsing sufficientarianism gives Kagan an alternate way out of the
problem I raise.
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2. Kagan’s Position
Many people think what matters is not just the total amount
of well-being, but also how it’s distributed. If (to use Kagan’s
example) men were extremely well-off while women were extremely poorly off, this would be “tremendously troubling”
(2019, 59) apart from its impact on the overall amount of wellbeing. If we could benefit women or provide a slightly larger
benefit to men, we might think we should benefit the women
for the sake of producing a more desirable distribution. An
egalitarian principle says that “an outcome is morally objectionable to the extent that the people in one group are significantly worse off than the members of another group” (ibid.).
Benefiting the women would reduce inequality. A sufficientarian view says that it’s “problematic… when someone ends up at
an unacceptably low level of well-being, with a life that would
be acknowledged as inadequate and limited by any objective
reckoning.” On such a view, it’s a “moral priority to bring people up to this baseline level,” but “once someone has reached it,
there is no longer a pressing moral mandate for the rest of us to
try to improve their lives even further” (59-60). If women are
below this baseline, it implies we should favor their interests in
order to raise them to it. Prioritarianism says that “we do more
good (from the moral point of view) the worse off the person is
that we choose to aid” (60). This implies that aiding the women
does more good, ceteris paribus, since they’re worse off. A
“desert sensitive theory” says we have reason to want to see
well-being apportioned to desert. Assuming men and women
are equally deserving, the distribution will be “troubling” because women are so much worse-off while being equally deserving. There are other possible distributive principles; Kagan
thinks it doesn’t matter for purposes of his argument which we
prefer (62).
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I’ll say a distribution is objectionable if it generates some
sort of claim on us--if, e.g., the distribution gives us reason to
favor benefiting A over benefiting B by an equally large amount
for the sake of making well-being more equal, or bringing A
up to the sufficientarian baseline, or apportioning well-being
in accordance with desert, or because A should have priority
due to being worse-off. The term “objectionable” may fit better
with some distributive principles than others, but it matches the
way Kagan speaks (e.g., “tremendously troubling”) and anyway can be taken stipulatively.
The problem for unitarianism arises from the fact that “people
are normally at a tremendously higher level of well-being than
animals are,” since there exist “a vast array of goods that people
can and typically do have in our lives which animals lack or at
best have in lesser amounts (or in less valuable forms)” (63). In
fact, Kagan (42-45) thinks the unitarian needs this to avoid the
counterintuitive judgment that you have no more reason to save
a human than a mouse: while both are (from the unitarian perspective) equal in moral status, we have much stronger reason
to save the human because the human, capable of achieving
much more well-being, has a stronger interest in continued life.
But consider that, if tremendous numbers of people were at
the low levels of well-being enjoyed by animals while a small
number were at the high levels enjoyed by human beings, we
would find this extremely objectionable. So if humans and animals have the same moral status, we should find the actual state
of affairs extremely objectionable. Egalitarianism implies that
we should heavily favor animal interests over human interests.
Prioritarianism implies the same. Since the level of well-being
enjoyed by a mouse would be far below the sufficientarian baseline for a human, sufficientarianism implies the same. The des-
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ert theory implies the same as well, perhaps except in cases
where humans have done something to make them more deserving (2019, 62-68).
We’re supposed to find something about this absurd. I see
two ways to interpret exactly what that is. At times, Kagan
speaks as though the unitarian is committed to saying that in
practice we’re required to redirect huge effort into addressing
the distributive claims of animals. Referring specifically to the
egalitarian principle, he writes:
...to the extent that one thinks that equality is a significant moral ideal... then the unitarian will need to find
the vast inequality that obtains between people and animals... to be a troubling and morally problematic state
of affairs, something that we should strive to redress.
This would seem to mean, for example, that instead
of favoring public policies under which we shift resources from those people who need them less to those
people who need them more, we should instead favor
policies under which we shift resources from people
quite generally to mice—and snakes, and birds, and
frogs, and perhaps flies—so as to do what we can...
to reduce the vast inequality that currently exists between people and animals.
Admittedly, there may not be all that much we can do
to improve the level of well-being for mice. But it isn’t
as though there is nothing at all that we could do. We
might, for example, take to leaving expensive cheeses
around for the mice to eat. Similarly, we could devote
ourselves to putting out seeds for birds, or carrots for
rabbits. There are myriad ways in which we could im-
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prove the welfare of animals, even if only modestly.
And it seems to follow from the unitarian position that
this is what we are in fact required to do.
But that, I think, is an absurd conclusion (64).
The problem with this interpretation is that the claim about
what we should do in practice doesn’t actually follow from the
unitarian position. For one thing, if our psychological capacities greatly increase our ability to flourish, presumably they
also greatly increase our ability to suffer, so that the worstoff humans are worse-off than the worst-off animals, and thus
more urgent subjects of concern. Second, even when it comes
to well-off humans, our ability to benefit them is likely much
greater than our ability to benefit animals (partly because of
the greatly increased capacity for flourishing that makes humans better-off to begin with). As long as distributive considerations are not lexically prior to considerations about the
overall amount of well-being--so that providing a much larger
benefit to the better-off party can outweigh providing a very
small benefit to the worse-off party--it may therefore make
more sense to focus on humans (Brouwer and van der Deijl
2020, 353-354). If all we could do to help the worst-off humans
was to give them a few pieces of fancy cheese, it seems far
from clear that it would make sense for public policy to focus
on this.
But at other times, Kagan can be read as suggesting that
what’s problematic is just the idea that the human/animal distribution is seriously objectionable at all--i.e., the idea that if we
could equally benefit animals or (comparatively well-off) humans, we’d have a strong reason to benefit the animals for the
sake of producing a more desirable distribution--regardless of
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whether this has radical implications in practice. For instance,
he says that he finds it “impossible to take seriously the suggestion that this inequality is, in and of itself, morally objectionable—that the mere fact that mice are worse off than us is morally problematic” (2019, 65) and that an advantage of his view
is that it allows us to “avoid the implausible position that the
current pattern—with mice, say, so much worse off than people—is necessarily itself an unreasonable or unfair one” (78).
I agree that it’s intuitively absurd to think the human/mouse
distribution is objectionable, whether or not, conveniently for
us, we don’t need to do much about this in practice. From here
on, I’ll go with this interpretation of Kagan’s argument.
Kagan’s response is to reject unitarianism in favor of the
view that animals have a lower moral status than humans. One
option would be to say that animals lack distributive claims altogether. Kagan rejects this on the grounds that “If distribution
is a legitimate and significant moral concern when it comes to
the welfare of people—and I take it that it is—then it is difficult
to see why it should suddenly become utterly irrelevant when
it comes to the welfare of animals” (2019, 77). Kagan instead
suggests that we should endorse distributive principles which
are in some appropriate way sensitive to moral status. What this
looks like depends on the distributive principle we favor. E.g.,
we might say that the sufficientarian baseline for an individual
with the moral status of a mouse is much lower than that of a
human. Accordingly, it may not be objectionable if a mouse is
at a level below the baseline for a human, provided the mouse is
above the mouse baseline. Further, even if the mouse is below
the mouse baseline, it will be below that baseline by less than
it would be below the human baseline, so its situation will still
be less objectionable than it would otherwise be (79-82). Kagan offers analogous suggestions (82-87) for other distributive
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principles: e.g., perhaps people deserve more well-being, just
in virtue of being people. By adopting the hierarchical view
of moral status, we can get the result that the human/animal
welfare distribution is unobjectionable, or at least not very objectionable. We thus avoid the counterintuitive unitarian claim
that it’s extremely objectionable.
For Kagan, moral status is determined primarily by one’s
psychological capacities (2019, ch. 5). Since members within
a species differ in their capacities, it’s thus strictly incorrect
to speak of a human moral status, a mouse moral status, etc.
What exists instead are the moral statuses typical of humans,
mice, etc. (ch. 5.2). However, Kagan also holds that what matters is not just one’s actual capacities, but also one’s potential
(ch. 5.4) and modal capacities (ch. 5.5). (Potential capacities
are one what can develop, while modal capacities are what one
could develop. E.g., a newborn is able to develop the capacity
to reason; someone born with irreversible brain damage could
have developed this capacity, had things gone differently.) Accordingly, even a human whose actual capacities are identical
to those of a particular animal will likely have a higher status
in virtue of their potential and/or modal capacities. This complication won’t come up again, and from now I’ll follow Kagan
in speaking (loosely) as if there’s a single status for members
of a species.

3. Humans and Elves
Assuming one’s life is going well, it’s better for one that it
last longer. And life expectancy seems relevant to distributive
concerns. People object to, for instance, the gap in life expectancy between Blacks and whites in the US, or between poor
people and rich people.
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But consider fantasy or science fiction stories in which members of species with roughly similar psychological capacities
have radically different life expectancies. Elves and humans,
for instance, have roughly the same psychological capacities, and so (on Kagan’s view) have roughly the same moral
status. Yet elves live many times longer than human beings.
However, people engaging with these stories don’t view this
as objectionable. They do not think that, say, society’s heavily discriminating in favor of humans in order to make up for
their shorter life spans would be justified. In fact, when fantasy
stories portray such discrimination (as in, say, The Witcher or
Dragon Age) you’re generally supposed to react to this in about
the way you’d react to real-world racism among humans. Yet at
least three of the four distributive principles Kagan discusses
apparently imply that it would be acceptable to discriminate in
favor of humans. The egalitarian principle implies that, since
humans are so much worse off than elves, we should (ceteris
paribus) heavily favor their interests over those of elves in order
to close the gap. The prioritarian principles implies we should
give their interests strong priority. Assuming elves and humans
are equally deserving, the desert-based principle implies that
we should favor humans because they are worse-off than elves
despite being equally deserving.
Indeed, an elven philosopher who read part of Kagan’s book
might argue in the following way:
If humans and elves had the same moral status, we
would be obligated to massively prioritize the interests
of humans over the interests of elves. (Think of how
objectionable we would find it if members of our lower
class lived a mere eighty years, instead of the centuries
the rest of us enjoy.) But of course we are not obligated

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 24, Issue 1

102
Dustin R. Crummett

to do this, as even humans engaging with stories about
us on Earth recognize. So humans must have a lower
moral status than we do.
This certainly doesn’t seem right. Yet neither does the inverse argument (perhaps offered by a human philosopher who
read a different part of Kagan’s book) that, since humans and
elves are both equal in moral status but elves live so much longer, the interests of humans should be very disproportionately
favored.
What explains our intuitions here? One possibility (which
Kagan (2019, 74-75) imagines being offered by the unitarian
about animals and people) is that distributive claims only arise
within species. Inequality between humans is objectionable, as
is inequality between elves, but inequality between elves and
humans generates no distributive claims. Kagan rejects this for
lacking a clear motivation. Indeed, it doesn’t really seem true
that distributive claims cannot arise between humans and elves.
Suppose elves lived so much longer, not because they were
naturally more long-lived, but because society arbitrarily privileged elves in such a way that they had the resources needed
to achieve long lifespans while humans didn’t. That certainly
would seem objectionable.
I think this last example shows us what’s really going on
here: we tend to discount distributive considerations when the
distributions in question are caused by natural forces rather
than the actions of moral agents. (I’m saying we tend to do this.
I’m not saying we’re always consistent about this--just that it’s a
factor which clearly influences our judgments in certain cases.)
The life expectancy gap between Blacks and whites is objectionable because it’s caused by systemic racism. There is also
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a life expectancy gap between, say, people with “good genes”
and people without them. For all I know, it may be larger. But
this gap is not intuitively objectionable, or at least not nearly
as objectionable. It’s just the good fortune of the people with
the good genes. The elf/human gap is relevantly like the bad
genes/good genes gap, and we aren’t bothered by either of these.
Similarly, the fact that Kagan’s example where men are much
better-off than women seems “tremendously troubling” is surely influenced by the fact that real-world instances of such distributions result from sexism.
Whether the tendency I’m discussing is justified is reflected
in the debate among egalitarian political philosophers between
luck egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. Luck egalitarians (e.g., Cohen 2008) aim at eliminating the influence of brute
luck--i.e., factors beyond a person’s control which make them
worse off than someone else--on human life. From the luck
egalitarian perspective (or at least the usual luck egalitarian
perspective; cf. Tan 2008), if I’m worse-off than you because
(say) you were born with some special talent which I lack, that
would generate a distributive claim just as surely as would my
being worse-off because I’m a member of an oppressed social
group. From a luck egalitarian point of view, the human/elf gap
would be extremely concerning, since it arises from natural
factors beyond any human’s control. The luck egalitarian rejects the tendency I am discussing.
Social egalitarians, meanwhile, view the aim of egalitarianism as establishing a community of equals, free from oppression (Anderson 1999). On this view, distributions matter
“as causes, consequences, or constituents of social relations. In
general, a distribution is objectionable from an egalitarian point
of view if it causes, embodies, or is a specific consequence of an
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unjust social hierarchy” (Anderson 2012, 53). The racial life expectancy gap is objectionable as the specific consequence of an
unjust social hierarchy. But social egalitarians will not object to
unequal distributions caused by natural forces, unless they have
some sort of pernicious effect: for instance, they won’t care if,
say, residents of one isolated planet are better off than those of
another (Anderson 2012, 54-55). Elizabeth Anderson illustrates
this in the following passage:
When I was in graduate school studying under Rawls,
the film Amadeus was released. Amadeus portrays a
rival to Mozart, Antonio Salieri, driven to insanity by
resentment at the fact that Mozart vastly exceeded him
in natural musical talent, although Mozart’s puerile and
vulgar character made him undeserving of his gifts.
Salieri’s musical talents had earned him a prestigious
position as director of Italian opera for the Habsburg
emperor. He was not inferior to Mozart in income or
employment. Yet he felt victimized by an injustice in
his natural inferiority to Mozart. Rawls told me that
he was appalled at the film’s sympathy toward Salieri’s perspective. To regard the superior natural good
enjoyed by another as an injury to the self is envious.
Envy is malicious, for the envious stake their sense of
well-being on another’s deprivation. Malicious claims
have no standing before the bar of justice (2010, 8).
Anderson would presumably say the same about the “superior natural good” enjoyed by the elves. On the social egalitarian
perspective, the elf/human distribution itself is objectionable.
(Of course, it could have pernicious effects--e.g., elves use their
long lives to amass wealth and power and dominate humans-
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-which needed to be addressed.) The social egalitarian accepts
the tendency I am discussing.
For my purposes, it’s not important whether or not the tendency I’m discussing is justified. The point is just this. The
gap between humans and other animals seems relevantly like
the gap between humans and elves. It arises, not from some
sort of unfair social process, but as the natural result of each
individual’s being a member of the species of which they’re
a part. If our tendency is justified and the gap between humans and elves is unobjectionable despite our equal moral status, then the “superior natural good” enjoyed by humans over
animals will not be objectionable either, even if we’re equal in
moral status. Unitarianism doesn’t have the implication Kagan
claims. On the other hand, suppose our tendency isn’t justified.
Then Kagan might reject our intuition about the human/elf gap
and say that favoring the interests of humans would be justified
after all. But in that case, it’s hard to see why Kagan should
be so confident about our intuition that the ordinary human/
animal case is unobjectionable from a distributive perspective.
We’re already saying that our intuitions about relevantly similar cases are unreliable. If anything, perhaps we should expect
our intuitions about the human/animal case to be even less
trustworthy. Despite his defense of humanity’s superior moral
status, Kagan (2019, 5) agrees that “Our treatment of animals
is a moral horror of unspeakable proportions, staggering the
imagination,” so presumably he agrees that we have a tendency
to discount the importance of animal interests to an unjustifiable degree as compared to those of humans (cf. Kasperbauer
2018). But of course, this intuition is the keystone of Kagan’s
argument against unitarianism. If Kagan goes this route, he
can maintain that unitarianism has the allegedly problematic
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implication, the justification for thinking it really is problematic becomes unclear.

4. Mice and Greenland Sharks
As far as I know, elves aren’t real. Some people are skeptical
of reliance on hypothetical cases. But we can find relevantly
similar cases in the real world. These won’t involve humans,
since, as far as we know, no other species has the kinds of psychological capacities we do. But they could involve other animals.
The longest lived vertebrate species is the Greenland shark.
They’re estimated to live between three and five hundred years.
I have no idea what the psychological capacities of the Greenland shark are. Neither do you, probably. Let’s say they’re about
equivalent to those of a mouse. (If this is false, there’s some
other animal I could have picked for which the comparison
would be accurate, and it wouldn’t make any difference.) Mice
(or whatever) don’t live nearly as long as Greenland sharks do,
and so are significantly worse off. In fact, mice live only a year
or two, and it seems reasonable to think they might have a lower quality of life at a time, too. (Being a prey animal probably
means being scared more often, etc.) So perhaps Greenland
sharks are hundreds of times as well-off as mice.
When it comes to egalitarian, prioritarian, and desert-based
principles, we can say exactly the same thing here that we said
about the elf/human gap in the last section. Popular distributive
principles, as interpreted by Kagan, imply that we have strong
reasons to prioritize the interests of mice over those of Greenland sharks. But this doesn’t seem right. It doesn’t seem like
we have much reason to go around leaving out fancy cheese for
mice to make up for the fact that their lives are so much shorter
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than those of Greenland sharks. Or if a zookeeper could choose
to enrich the zoo’s habitats for either the mice or the Greenland
sharks, and the Greenland sharks would benefit much more,
few people think the zookeeper would have strong countervailing reasons to instead enrich the mouse habitat to make up for
their shorter lives.
Yet the hierarchical moral status view doesn’t help us here.
On Kagan’s view, Greenland sharks are equal in moral status to
mice (or whatever). An alternative would be to say that, while
there is some distributive claim here, it’s extremely weak: since
mice and Greenland sharks have lower moral status than we
do, their distributive claims are comparatively weak. Maybe
we mistakenly think the gap is unobjectionable because it isn’t
very objectionable. But it isn’t clear that it wouldn’t be very objectionable. Even if (due to lesser moral status) the suffering
of a mouse is not as serious as the suffering of a human, the
intense suffering of a mouse still seems pretty serious. So if
such a huge gap in life expectancy would be very objectionable between two human beings, it seems that it ought to be at
least pretty objectionable for such a large gap to obtain between
the mouse and the Greenland shark, unless the significance of
distributive claims is much more sensitive to status than is the
significance of suffering. But why would that be?
One possible explanation for the judgment that the mouse/
shark distribution is unobjectionable is that we intuitively don’t
think animals make distributive claims at all. If this is right,
Kagan should reject the intuition, since he thinks animals can
make distributive claims. Otherwise, it seems to me that what’s
happening here is the same as what’s happening in the human/elf case: we don’t consider the mouse/shark distribution
objectionable because it arises from more or less purely natu-
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ral causes. (On the other hand, when a distribution involving
animals is the result of human action, it seems intuitively more
plausible to think that it could generate strong moral claims (cf.
e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).) So we can say something
exactly analogous to the final paragraph of the previous section: if the tendency to discount distributions caused by natural
forces is justified, Kagan can say his view avoids condemning
the mouse/shark distribution, but the unitarian can say the same
about their view and the human/animal distribution. If it’s unjustified, Kagan can error theorize the intuition that the mouse/
shark distribution is unobjectionable, but the unitarian can do
the same for the intuition about the human/animal distribution.

5.Sufficientarianism
Perhaps sufficientarianism provides Kagan with an alternate
way out of these examples. On sufficientarianism, distributive
claims don’t arise if everyone is above the baseline. Perhaps
both humans and elves (in the sorts of stories we’re imagining) are above the baseline for creatures of their moral status,
and both mice and Greenland sharks are above the baseline
for creatures of their moral status. Then there will be nothing
objectionable about either of these distributions. Yet the fact
that there are two different moral statuses in play, with two
different baselines, allows us to say this without committing
ourselves to saying that there would be nothing objectionable
about a situation where human beings were at the level of wellbeing enjoyed by the mice.
I see two worries here. First, the claim that sufficientarianism is true is much more controversial than the claim that some
distributive principle or other is true. If Kagan must commit
himself specifically to sufficientarianism, his argument becomes much less worrisome.
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Second, I suggest that we don’t really have good independent
reason to accept that the individuals in all these cases are above
their respective baselines, and in fact that its being true would
require a kind of suspicious coincidence. As before, Kagan suggests that the differing sufficientarian baselines for different
individuals is determined by their psychological capacities:
In fixing these baselines, what is it that makes it true
that one kind of animal (a rabbit, say, or a fish) has a
baseline that is lower than that had by another (a dog,
or an elephant)? Why is it that an adequate life for an
animal of one sort is different from an adequate life
for an animal of another sort? Why is a decent life for
a person so much higher in quality than a decent life
for an animal? The answer, clearly, has to do with the
psychological capacities of the different types of individuals (2019, 81).
This tells us that individuals with the same psychological
capacities (including the same potential and modal capacities)
have the same baseline, and that individuals with greater capacities have a higher baseline than those with lesser capacities. But it doesn’t tell us what, in absolute terms, the baseline for individuals with a given set of capacities should be.
In discussing the difficulties involved in determining what the
baseline for a sufficiently good life is, Kagan plausibly suggests
that we cannot “stipulate that the baseline is simply the average
life actually lived by people (since it is easy enough to imagine
worlds in which everyone has a more than decent life, or a less
than decent one)” (80). He suggests it’s plausible to say that “a
good enough life is one in which the person’s basic needs are
reasonably met,” but correctly notes that this simply relocates
the difficulty into determining what it is for someone’s “ba-
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sic needs to be reasonably met” (ibid.). He suggests that, for
all this, “we do seem capable of judging certain human lives
as good enough, others as better than that, and still others as
falling short of any level reasonably considered adequate for a
person. And it seems clear that comparable judgments can be
made about animals as well” (ibid.). Presumably we’re able to
make these judgments by consulting our intuitions about various cases.
The problem here is that our intuitions about what constitutes a decent life for an individual are pretty clearly affected in
some way by (something like) the life expectancy achievable by
an average member of their species under realistic, somewhat
favorable conditions, quite apart from any differences in the
psychological capacities which are supposed to fix the sufficientarian baselines on Kagan’s view. If we were elves and poor
members of our society were dying after a mere eighty years,
we’d think they were being denied good enough lives, just like
we think in response to the deaths of human children. We don’t
think this about humans who die at that eighty years. But if
elves and humans have the same moral status, they should have
the same baseline. So at most one judgment can be correct. But
it’s unclear why we should trust the judgment about humans
over the judgment about elves--and if the elf judgment is correct, humans are below the baseline and the distribution is objectionable after all.
In fact, the situation is even worse than this suggests. Suppose we were members of a species with the same psychological capacities as humans but a much shorter life span. We’d
probably again be inclined to think that our longest-lived conspecifics had “good enough” lives. If this judgment is correct,
Kagan avoids the problem I’ve been raising: both elves and hu-
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mans will be above the sufficientarian baseline, so the elf/human distribution is unobjectionable (given sufficientarianism).
However, it creates another problem for Kagan. The thrust of
Kagan’s original argument was that we would find distributions
between humans and animals unobjectionable which we would
find extremely objectionable among humans. But this has force
only to the extent that we’re at least roughly accurate in our
judgments about what’s objectionable among humans.
As I’ve discussed, one option for unitarians is to argue that
they can consider inequitable distributions among humans objectionable when caused by unjust social forces while denying
that human/animal distributions are objectionable in general.
Another is to say that the human/animal distribution is objectionable and error theorize the intuition. But if we’re sufficientarians and are open to the possibility that the baseline for
humans is much lower than we think, another option becomes
available: just deny that the relevant human distributions are
objectionable. Kagan could respond that, even if the baseline is
very low, some humans and animals will fall below it (e.g., by
having net bad lives). We’d probably regard a human’s being at
the same negative level of welfare as more objectionable than
an animal’s being at that level. If humans and animals have
different baselines, this could be explained as the human being
below the human baseline by more than the mouse is below the
mouse baseline, even though they’re both at the same absolute
level (cf. Kagan 2019, 82). But this isn’t really available if the
human baseline is very low. If it is, then assuming the mouse
baseline isn’t negative, the human and mouse baselines mathematically cannot be very different, in absolute terms.
So here’s the problem. Kagan needs our actual judgments
about the human baseline to be roughly accurate. But these
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judgments would differ depending on how long, given favorable conditions, we actually lived. So it seems we should trust
our actual judgments only if we think humans happen, under
favorable conditions, to live about as long as the actual baseline
for individuals of our moral status requires. But why would that
be? Perhaps God benevolently created humans so that, under
favorable conditions, we would tend to have sufficiently good
lives. But I don’t think Kagan wants to say that, and otherwise,
it seems like a massive coincidence.
Similar points apply in the mouse/shark case. If a zoo’s
Greenland sharks were kept in conditions such that they died
after only a year or two, we’d think they were being denied
good enough lives. But we don’t think this about mice who die
at that age. Again, at most one of these judgments can be correct. In fact, in order to avoid problematic examples involving
non-humans, it needs to be more-or-less true in general that life
expectancy and moral status vary in such a way that animals
generally have “good enough” lives under favorable conditions,
regardless of their moral status. (Otherwise we could make the
same point by substituting for mice members of some species
that never reaches the baseline, and substituting for Greenland
sharks members of some psychologically similar species with a
longer lifespan.) But why would this be? It’s true that we probably can expect some very general correlation between life expectancy and moral status: animals which are K-selected rather
than r-selected tend both to have greater psychological capacities and to live longer. (Creatures which are K-selected (e.g.,
humans) have relatively few, high investment offspring, while
creatures which are r-selected (e.g., mice) have relatively many,
low-investment offspring.) But this doesn’t solve the problem:
why couldn’t the real baseline just be a very high one that no
creatures, K- or r-selected, meet?
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So this makes me wary of the sufficientarian response. It does
seem intuitive to say that, e.g., a reasonably well-off mouse is
living a good enough life, or that a reasonably well-off human
is doing so. Yet, given Kagan’s account of moral status and of
how it determines the sufficientarian baseline, these intuitions
conflict with our intuitions about elves and Greenland sharks,
and it seems clear that our intuitions are being affected by factors which seem, on Kagan’s view, to be morally irrelevant.
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